Oh the joyous endeavor

My resolve to be more consistent in updating this blog has failed dismally. School has now been in session for a little over three weeks, thus far I've read about 7-8 full books. Yep go me, I read a lot...that's about all I do. In all likelihood, I will be even worse about updating this blog in the coming month or two. In fact, if I post at all it will be an enormous surprise to me (and will likely only be the result of a stress-induced psychological meltdown). Yesterday morning I sat down with Dr. Haanstad and hashed out the details of my senior thesis, that is to say, I completely changed the entire framework of the entire paper(thus nullifying a large amount of already conducted research, a little bit of writing, and a lot of profound thoughts). So I've gone from having to use two IR theoretical perspectives to assess the 1953 CIA coup in Iran, to using a single perspective. Also, I got an page limit extension...I think. All of these changes were at my instigation. What can I say, other than I'm a masochist? Here's my reasoning: 1) I want to write something that is publishable. To write a 20-25 page paper on an event that's as nuanced as the coup, using two perspectives that are even more nuanced...well it accomplishes nothing other than fulfilling an assignment. 2) I've been looking a lot at the Ph.D. program at the Ohio State University(Major field: International Affairs, Minor field: International/Comparative Political Psycholoy [especially identity formation]). Alexander Wendt (if Waltz is the father of modern IR theory, Wendt is its resucitator) teaches at OSU and it is his work primarily that I am building off. 3) I don't particularly like limits I've decided. I could have fulfilled the initial assignment--probably could have written most of the paper already--but I would have been bored out of my mind. 4) The theoretical perspective--Social Constructivism--is too expansive to be contained in an 8 page segment.

Ok the justifications dealt with, I guess it's best I sketch the direction that this paper is heading. I'll be really brief now and will post the entirety of the paper when I'm done. Basically, I'm looking at the evolution of the United States National Security identity from approximately 1946 (when the Allies were SUPPOSED to have pulled all of their troops out of a divided Iran; the Soviets failed to comply) up until August 19, 1953 (coincidentally, August 19, 2003 was the first time that the UN was ever deliberately targeted by a terrorist organization). There are a lot of factors that play a role in that 7 year period, among them are: the rise, fall, and reemergence of the Tudeh (communist) party in Iran; the Tudeh's attempted assasination of Reza Pahlavi in 1949; the fall of China in 1949; the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950; Iran's nationalization of oil in 1951; Eisenhower's election in 1953 (this is not so important though, as I believe the path was already set by national security identity that had solidified within the US by this time); the death of Stalin less than a month after Eisenhower's inauguration (I'm trying to maintain a systemic level analysis so Stalin himself is not so important--like Eisenhower--but the level of uncertainty and perceived instability among the communist bloc because of his death was important; the end of the Korean War--at best a draw; and finally the coup, 12 days after the armistice was signed. Wendt makes the assertion that all states possess multiple identities and that, in most instances, these identities can coexist. However, sometimes identities will come into conflict, in which case one must prevail. In the case of the United States, the identities that came into conflict were that of "promoter of democracy" (a naive Wilsonian ideal) and "globabl defender against Soviet/Communist aggression." Illustrative of the first perspective was the so-called Truman Doctrine, based on Kennan's "long telegram," a train of thought that believed the Soviet system would eventually implode on itself, but only if the United States continued to hold itself up as the ideal citizen--an open, free, and democratic society. NSC-68, courtesy of Paul Nitze, provides illustration of the second, much more aggressive, perspective. Kennan wrote his article shortly after the Soviet's violated the agreement regarding the occupation of Iran, while NSC-68 was authored around the time of the onset of the Korean War (not sure if it was before or after...yet). This conflict, and the inability to completely abandon either identity, also explains why covert operations rather than overt military occupation. The Soviet's were broadcasting themselves as the leader of the Third World, at around the same time that a nationalist fervor was sweeping through that region, had the United States acted militarily their actions would have been construed as imperialistic and would have drawn the acrimony of those emerging states. At the same, however, the possibility of Moscow spreading its influence into Iran (at the time, the world's third largest natural gas and oil reserve) was unacceptable--it wasn't just oil that was important, in fact, oil seems an after-the-fact consideration, what was likely more important was the proximity of Iran to...well nearly everything in the Middle East and Indochina. Further, the success of Operation AJAX (a stupid name for the operation drawn up by CIA Operation Chief Kermit Roosevelt, after some Greek with whom I am not familiar) ushered in a new era of US policy. The coup in Iran was followed, less than a year later, by a coup in Guatemala, as well as by Chile 20 years later (there are others in that 20 year period, but I haven't gotten that far yet).

So, in a nutshell, that's about where I'm at right now.

As for anything else in life, um...I went to San Francisco, for FREE, this last weekend.