Well...it's a start...

Today, as the United States ends the seventh year of the “War on Terror” and the fifth year of since the invasion of Afghanistan, it is suffering from an international image crisis—an ebb in its global “soft power”1 projection. Perhaps nowhere on the planet is this more pronounced than in the United States' interaction with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The key point of contention with Iran is its supposed pursuit of nuclear weapons2 as well as its continued state sponsorship of terrorism.3 Volatile U.S.-Iranian relations are not new, however, nor are they limited just to the presidency of George W. Bush. The two countries have remained in a contentious relationship since the inception of the Islamic Republic, replacing the Republic of Iran, in 1979—under the leadership of the radical, yet charismatic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In 1979, Khomeini led the Iranian people in a quest to liberate themselves from the iron-fisted rule of Mohammed Reza Shah. The Shah, the last to hold the “peacock throne” was supported by the United States and viewed as a valuable ally on the frontlines of the struggle to “contain”4 Soviet expansion and Communist pervasion.
When a group of revolutionaries, mostly students from the University of Tehran,5 took control of the United States embassy in Tehran, holding its occupants, including CIA agents, hostage for 444 days, many Americans began asking the question: “Why do they hate us?”6 This was, however, a question formulated out of ignorance, because, after all, it was the United States that hindered Iran's progression towards democracy and popular rule. It was the United States that interfered in Iranian politics, instigating 25 years of authoritarian rule under the Shah. That is to say, Iran was on the path to democratic rule, starting with the Constitutional Revolution of 1909-12. They had, additionally, elected a much-revered, populist prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, who had promised to lead Iran towards modernization and independence from imperial interference—this determination manifested itself primarily in the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry in 1951. In 1953, the CIA engineered a coup d'etat in Iran, ousting Mossadegh and installing the loyalist, General Zahidi, as a puppet prime minister.
Contrary to the belief of U.S. President Jimmy Carter, the events of 1953 do not, in fact, echo meaninglessly as “ancient history.” In actuality, Iran was the first central battleground of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. As will be detailed below, 1953 was a momentous and propitious moment in world history.
Strangely, at the outset of the 20th Century, the United States had shown little interest in the events within what was then known as Persia—it would later, under Reza Shah, be named Iran; in an attempt to shed the imperialistic moniker. By the time the United States entered the second World War, however, Iran has come within range of its radar. Having suffered nearly a century of imperial interference, at the hands of both the British and the Russians, the Iranians were in search of liberation. They viewed America with awe and fascination, but it was Nazi Germany that first staked its own anti-imperialist liberation claim in Iran. The incursions by the Nazis was cause for concern on the part of the Allies, and in 1941 the British succeeded in ousting Reza Shah, replacing him with his 21 year old son, Muhammad.
The critical question then is how did the United States go from a country with virtually no knowledge of Persia in 1900 to direct involvement in the politics of Iran in 1953. Oil was discovered by William Know D'Arcy in central Iran in 1906 (?). Neither of the prevailing schools of international relations theory do an adequate job of explaining the evolution in U.S. Policy towards Iran; before, during, or after World War II. Realism focuses on material sources of power, in this case oil, but oil was, at best, a secondary or tertiary motivation for the United States because it never established full control of Iran's most abundant natural resource. Nor does liberalism offer a much better explanation because President Roosevelt's goal of making Iran an example of the potential of “big three”—the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union—cooperation failed when neither the Soviets or the British abided by the commitments they both made at the Tehran Conference to leave the country within 6 months of the end of the war. Also neither of these approaches adequately addresses why the United States changed its thinking on Iran so rapidly—50 years in international politics is, after all, a rather brief period. Thus, a viable alternative is that of social constructivism. Constructivism, arguably the newest of International Relations theories, is a multifaceted approach to international politics. Areas of concern to constructivists include: Identities, interests, norms, and values. Here, the first of these will be used to analyze the evolution of U.S. Policy towards Iran from the end of World War II up until August 19, 1953, the day of the execution of Operation Ajax.