Iran and the Emergence of the Cold War: A Case Study in the Social Construction of State Identity

Here is my first draft of my senior seminar paper...for anyone who cares to drudge through what most will likely consider monotonous and steeped in too much historical fact--a necessary evil in dealing with a theory of process such as identity evolution. THIS IS A DRAFT, I have made ZERO edits to this point. Enjoy! Also, I directly copy and pasted this from word without any regard for the formatting incompatability.

On the morning of August 19, 1953, a crowd of protestors swept through the streets of Tehran, Iran. The crowd was composed of members of the clergy, army and police; as it marched through the streets, its numbers swelled with the addition of onlooker. Many who joined the protestors on August 19, were angered by similar demonstrations that had beset Tehran two days earlier. The earlier protest, however, was supposedly composed of a group that had the diametric opposite ideology from that of the army and police: The Tudeh party and its supporters, or the Iranian Communist party. This earlier crowd, however, was not what it seemed to be; but was a product of shrewd social engineering. Chiefly responsible for the engineering of this earlier protest was the CIA, under the direction of Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA’s Near East Operations Chief. Roosevelt had chosen to codename the operation in Iran Operation Ajax, after the mythical hero of the Trojan War. The crowd had been procured by two CIA contacts in Iran, the Rashidian brothers, who had paid initial participants a total of $50,000. This crowd swept through the streets “shouting Tudeh slogans and carrying signs denouncing the Shah” and was joined by actual Tudeh members as it continued its procession.
Amidst all of these street protests by various factions, Iranian politics was also embroiled in turmoil of its own. On August 16, the shah had issued a firmans (farsi for royal decree) calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. This move too was not exclusively concocted by the Iranians, but was initiated by the CIA. By the end of August 19, the loyalist protestors and the issuance of the firmans would result in Mohammed Mossadegh’s demise as Prime Minister of Iran. In his stead, General Fazlollah Zahedi—the man favored by the CIA to take the position—assumed office. In short, the CIA had just pulled off a coup d’etat ending the tenure of a democratic prime minister and ushering in a new era for Iranian politics. As the prime minister position changed hands, executive authority was transferred from the Prime Minister to the shah. In essence, a dictatorship was created, but one with a parliament and prime minister to give it the appearance of a legitimate democratic institution.
Conducting a coup d’etat in Iran was a vast divergence from the policy of the United States towards Iran that had been formulated during the final years of World War II. Iran had been the site of one of the first conferences between the Allies for deciding the best way to end the war and to reformulate international politics in the aftermath of the war. The Tehran Conference, running from November 28 to December 1, 1943, had brought together President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshall Stalin to discuss these plans. The conference was met with much anticipation and optimism, especially about the possibility of continued cooperation between the three countries. To Roosevelt, Iran was an excellent place to use an example of exactly what such cooperation could accomplish. Furthermore, Roosevelt, at Tehran, assured the world that the United States and Soviet Union were “going to get along very well with…the Russian people—very well indeed.” Similarly, the sentiment of the majority of Americans towards the Soviet Union at this time one was profound appreciation, viewing the Soviet Union as a valiant ally. By 1953, these three situations had changed dramatically: Iran was no longer the scene for cooperation but competition between the three former allies, and the friendship of the United States and Soviet Union had turned into a bitter rivalry and the Red Scare was sweeping through America —the Cold War had begun. Iran was the first instance of U.S.-Soviet interaction outside of the context of war and alliance, the first chance to interact without all the exigencies associated such an overwhelming situation.
The centrality of the Tudeh party in the aforementioned protests that led to Mossadegh’s demise offer an insight into Iranian politics during this time: communism and democracy were both vying for power. Thus, Iran was a center for the ideological struggle that occurred between the Soviet Union and United States. The interaction between the two superpowers took on a new appearance in the immediate aftermath of the war and Iran was a microcosm of this interaction. As a result of this interaction, the United States and Soviet Union were both forced to reevaluate their conceptions of each other. This reevaluation, in turn, caused the United States to reformulate its foreign policy role identities to correspond with these perceptions. The United States by 1953 had abandoned the role that it had occupied since World War I, that of global promoter of democracy (Wilsonian Identity). In its place, the role that was taken up was that of global defender against communist expansion (Anti-Communist Identity). Neither of these roles are inherently mutually exclusive, but as Alexander Wendt asserts, when identities come into conflict the more salient one will win out. The events that had transpired from the time of the Tehran Conference to the eve of August 19, 1953 had caused the Anti-Communist Identity to become the more salient identity for the United States.
The Process of Identity Evolution: Social Constructivism
One of the most recent introductions as a theory of international relations is that of social constructivism. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the unforeseen end of the cold war, and the diminution of Marxism as an explanatory theory, constructivism has risen as one of the foremost challengers to the more traditional approaches of neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Maja Zehfuss is correct in contending that the label ‘constructivism’ or ‘social constructivism’ has been applied to a diverse range of writing. Zehfuss’s further contends that “it appears that more often than not constructivism is related to an exploration…of the issue of identity in international politics.” The concept of identities is not new in and of itself, having traditionally been within the purview of fields such as psychology and sociology, what is novel about the constructivist approach, however, is the application of identity to states as singular entities.
According to Ted Hopf, identities are a necessary part of international politics because they provide “at least some minimal level of predictability and order…a world without identities is a world of chaos…a world much more dangerous than anarchy” But what exactly is this ambiguous concept of “identity” that is so crucial to the functioning of international politics? Attempting to establish a universal, concrete definition of identity would be roughly equivalent to defining ‘power’ in the context. Developmental psychologist and identity theorist, Erik Erickson, offered an insightful assessment of the task of defining identity stating that it was “all pervasive” while at the same time “vague” and “unfathomable.” Thus, the best that can be hoped for is a broad definition of identity with a further refinement based on individual scenarios. At the most basic level, as it applies to the state, identity is the state’s self-image—the definition of Self. Alexander Wendt offers further refinement in stating that “[t]o have an identity is…to have certain ideas about who one is in a given situation….” Samuel Huntington provides the useful insight that state identities are, however, not formed independent of the Other:
“[Identity] is a product of self-consciousness, that [the state] possess[es] distinct qualities as an entity that differentiates me from you and us from them.”

Identity then is not something that can be viewed in isolation; that is to say, it requires others for one to be able to define Self. In other words, state identities are formed by repeated interactions between one state and the others in the international system; or: “…identities are made, not given.” This creation of identity further implies that state identities are, in fact, not fixed, static attributes but rather change over time as interaction between states changes. Thus is not a “thing” but rather an ongoing, ever-changing process of constitution and reconstitution. The implication of this dynamic property of state identity is that “by understanding that identities are created through interaction, we open the door to systemic change.”
Thus, for interaction to occur, an international society of states is necessary for the development of state identities, even if that society consists of only two states. The belief that interaction is necessary for identity creation has long been the domain of symbolic interactionists—finding root in the writing of George Herbert Meade. The causal hypothesis in symbolic interactionism is that “actors learn identities…as a result of how significant others treat them,” while the constitutive hypothesis is that roles are identities that are “related to the role-identities of other actors.” It is this concept of role-identity that is important for the discussion of the evolution of United States policy during the years 1943 to 1953 in Iran.
Role identities are precisely those identities that exist only in relation to Others:
…one can have these [role] identities only by occupying a position in a social structure and following behavioral norms toward Others possessing relevant counter-identities.

In other words, “every self is incomplete without an other.” For the United States during the aforementioned decade, the most significant Other in the international system was not just the Soviet Union, but Communism as a monolithic, global identity. As the interaction between the United States and Communism took on new dimensions following the end of World War II, the conception of Self and Other had to be reevaluated. This reevaluation of the Other necessitated a reevaluation of the role-identity that the United States was to play in international politics, a reevaluation based on the new conception of the Other. This conception of role-identity, by drawing on symbolic interactionism, is, in contrast to “foreign policy role theorists” who focus on domestic politics in the creation of foreign policy roles, a structural theory because it is reliant upon, as mentioned above, the existence of an international system or society of states.
As the Soviet Union changed tact, apparently becoming more militant and power-hungry, and Communism became increasingly perceived as a pernicious global epidemic, the United States was forced to adapt its role-identity. The reason for this forced change in identity is that “what really matters in defining roles is not institutionalization but the degree of interdependence between Self and Other.” Thus the United States and Soviet Union/Communism, in the wake of World War II, became reliant upon each other in order to define the Self. Wendt observes that when interdependence is high, “roles may not be just a matter of choice that can be cast aside but a position forced on actors by the representation of significant Others…even if a state wants to abandon a role it may be unable to do so because the Other resists out of desire to maintain its identity.” By 1953, the United States and Soviet Union were thus engaged in a vicious cycle: the Soviet Union needed the United States in order to broadcast itself as the leader of the Third-World and the foremost anti-imperialist state in the world, while the United States needed the Soviet Union in order to reinforce its Anti-Communist and Wilsonian Identities. States can occupy multiple role identities at once, each one being a sort of script for who a state is and what it can do (in terms of policy and action). As Communism spread throughout the decade immediately following the end of World War II, however, the United States was forced to play both the Anti-Communist and Wilsonian Identities, while each of those identities created different, conflicting scripts for what the United States should do.
Iran has been chosen as the subject to demonstrate this evolution of U.S. foreign policy role-identity because it was at the forefront of the formulative years of Soviet-U.S. interaction—beginning with the Tehran Conference from November 28 to December 1, 1943. Also, the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in August on 1953, was the final death knell to the Wilsonian Identity that the United States had occupied since World War I and the solidification of the Anti-Communist Identity as the most salient role-identity occupied by the United States. However, as will be shown, the anti-democratic characteristic of this action did not stop the United States from continuing to try and put on the façade that it was still an ardent supporter of democracy—a sort of faux Wilsonian Identity. Furthermore, Iran was a microcosm for the ideological struggle that the United States was engaged in globally: a vibrant democracy but with a strong communist presence.
Tehran and Beyond: Roosevelt’s Vision for the Post-War World
Prior to the outbreak of World War II, Soviet-U.S. interactions had been severely limited. Both countries had, during the period following World War I, embarked on largely isolationist policies—seeking to bolster their internal dynamic and security. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was undergoing a monumental change in its internal politics, attempting to shift from the feudalism of Czarist Russia to Marxist-Leninist Communism. With the onset of World War II, these two nations were thrown into an alliance of necessity to combat the world’s biggest threat: Nazi Germany. The ideologies of both Soviet communism and American democracy—along with the United Kingdom, the third of the Allied powers—were diametrically opposed to the fascism of the Nazi party.
One of the first instances of the Allies working together occured in Iran. Tired of the interference by outside powers and imperialist forces—chiefly Russia and Britain—Iran, under Reza Shah, had been swayed into the Nazi camp:
Nazi Germany, well aware of Iran’s hatred toward Britain and Russia, courted Reza Shah throughout the decade. They bestowed on the Persians the honor of Aryan status and expanded trade between the two nations; Berlin flooded the country with agents and propaganda.

Iran, with its ports on the Persian Gulf and proximity to both Europe and the Soviet Union was too strategically important to allow Nazi influence to subsume the country. Thus, Iran was invaded by the Soviets and the British on August 25, 1941. One of the primary reasons for the takeover of Iran was so that the United States, although still not officially party to the war, could supply weapons, via the Trans-Iran Railroad, to the Soviet Union.
The British administered southern Iran, the Soviets controlled the north, and the Iranians controlled central Iran. The Iranians feeling like they were a colonized people, turned to the exemplary protector of democracy and promoter of national self-determination, the United States, for “guarantees and assurance.” The United States pushed for the Soviets and British to pledge that the takeover was only temporary, but did not require an immediate withdrawal of either side. Here can be seen the first fracture in the United States’ Wilsonian Identity. Certainly they were trying to protect the right Iran to govern itself, but they were not pressing the issue as a staunch defender of democracy would have and demanding that self-rule be returned immediately. Finally, in January, 1942, Britain and the Soviet Union signed a treaty assuring the Iranians that their occupation of the country would end within six months of the conclusion of the war.
Iran once again appeared to be falling prey to the machinations of the two countries that had longue plagued its internal workings: Britain and Russia. With the agreement that the two would not leave until after the war—a time that would not come until nearly 4 years later—the two continued to administer their respective sections of the country. The Soviets began to spread their communist ideology and pushed the people of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan to secede from Iran. Proof that the United States did not yet harbor great fear or animosity towards the Soviet Union at this time came was evidenced by the fact that, despite the Soviet actions, the United States reserved its greatest criticisms for the behavior of the British, who were viewed as exploiting Iranian resources and citizens.
The United States fearing the outcome if the division of Iran were allowed to continue decided to turn Iran into the example of what the Allies could accomplish with a cooperative effort, an example of the envisioned post-war world. President Roosevelt was “thrilled by the idea” and felt that it would be “far better for Iran to become an example of Allied cooperation” than for it to be partitioned into three separate territories. This enthusiasm led to the Tehran Conference from November 28 to December 1, 1943. The Tehran Declaration that resulted from the conference, not only guaranteed the cooperation of the Allies regarding Iran but laid the groundwork for the United Nations, an organization that would embody the cooperative spirit that was to become the international norm following the end of the war. Shortly before the Tehran Conference, Iran held elections for the Majilis (parliament); “the first free [election] in many years.” Thus, democracy, on however limited a scale had come to Iran by the time the Allies set down to chart the course for the world. Thus, despite Soviet behavior in promoting the spread of communism to Iran, the United States still maintained that the two great powers were not destined for rivalry but for cooperation. For whatever threat communism and the Soviet Union were perceived as being, it was not great enough for the United States to redefine its identity to that of the global anti-communist force. Furthermore, the interaction between the two countries up to this point allowed them to continue to define each other as ally or potential ally. And although the United States’ Wilsonian Identity had shown a crack in its surface by allowing the occupation of Iran, it was still able to help perpetuate democracy with the elections of 1943.
The amicable sentiments of U.S.-Soviet interaction would soon take a sharp turn, causing each country to reassess their conception of Self and Other, although an all-out role-identity change would not result…yet. By 1944, Iran was engulfed in a crisis; a crisis that caused the United States to begin a reassessment of what the intentions of the Soviet Union really were. The Soviets began pressing for the oil concessions by the Iranian government, similar to those that had been given to Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in the South. To counter the pressure by the Soviets, the Iranians invited the American oil companies to the negotiations. The Iranian Prime Minister, an adept tactician, averted the crisis by calling off all further concessions until after the war (perhaps not until after the Allies were supposed to have withdrawn from Iran). Of course this caused animosity on the part of the Soviets, who began to blame the United States for interfering in the oil concession process. The Soviet response, possible to intimidate the Americans, was essentially a “temper tantrum,” with Soviet troops driving through the streets of Tehran and Tudeh (Persian for ‘Masses,’ the Iranian Communist party) protests.
These actions by Moscow were accompanied by belligerency in Turkey and Eastern Europe, prompting State Department Soviet specialist George Kennan to ask where the Soviets would stop. The Soviet Union had thus shown to the United States a course of action that the Americans had not anticipated, a course of action that caused the Americans to reassess what exactly the Soviet Union stood for and what it would seek to accomplish in the post-war world. As one state department official wrote:
What frightens me…is that when a country begins to extend its influence by strong-arm methods beyond its borders under the guise of security it is difficult to see how a line can be drawn. If the policy is accepted that the Soviet Union has a right to penetrate her immediate neighbors for security, penetration of the next immediate neighbors becomes at a certain time equally logical…

Despite this deplorable behavior by the Soviets, the United States still did not object to the spreading of Soviet influence as long as it was done through “friendly agreements.” Thus, while suspicions about Soviet intentions were beginning to stir in Washington, the United States still viewed the Soviet Union in relatively positive terms.
Nineteen forty five saw the crisis continue apace, however. The U.S. began to see the Soviet Union and its policies in a new light:
…Moscow’s policy seemed to be one of using occupation troops, secret police, local Communist parties, labor unions, sympathetic leftist organizations, cultural societies, and economic pressure to establish regimes outwardly independent but in practice subservient to the Kremlin.

In Iran, this practice manifested itself in the Soviet backing of a separate state in the northern province of Iran, as well as support for a Kurdish state. The Soviets thus appeared to be preparing to violate the commitment that it had made in January, 1942 to depart Iran. “Iran, which had earlier been seen as a test case for postwar Anglo-American-Soviet Cooperation had now become a decisive battleground in the emerging Cold War. United States-Iranian relations…had now become the centerpiece of a global crisis.”
Even so, the sentiments in the United States continued to view the Soviets ambivalently, if not favorably. The one sector of the U.S. government that would have been most likely to view the Soviets as an eminent threat, the military, did not exhibit such fear in 1945. Goldwaithe Dorr, an adviser in the Department of War, captured the essence of exactly how identities shift from ally to rival, and feared that such a fate would befall the United States and Soviet Union should the fear and near-paranoia about Soviet expansionism be allowed to continue:
I do not know how we can expect to receive from the Russians a tolerance for the existence of the capitalist system…if we cannot feel the same tolerance with regard to the socialist form of economy.

In essence, Dorr was arguing for restraint on the part of the United States, in order to allow for perceptions to be properly vetted, rather than acted on haphazardly. Dorr also captured what Wendt refers to “alter-casting” and “role taking,” in which the misperceptions on either side could cause the other to take on an identity that it did not intend to have.
Violating Commitments and the Kennan Intermediary Identity (1946-49)
Nineteen forty-six saw the explosion of the crisis in Iran. U.S.-Soviet relations, although not past the point of no return, also moved rapidly from ally to rival. March 2, 1946 was the date that had earlier been agreed upon by the Allies for all troops to be out of Iran. The Americans, having never formally occupied any portion of Iran were easily able to meet their commitment, the British too withdrew all troops, but the Soviets lingered. The fears of the United States that had begun to materialize in 1944 and 45 about just what the Soviet post-war identity would look like, appeared vindicated. If an ally was violating the agreements it had made, how could its intentions be trusted? By the March, 26, however, the Soviets had conceded and agreed to withdraw their troops from Iran. The Tudeh, however, had grown in size and marched in protest through the streets of Tehran. Thus it appeared that communism had indeed infiltrated Iran on a deeper scale than mere occupation by the Soviet Union. What would follow should have given rise to much alarm within the United States about just how serious a threat communism in Iran truly was—and consequently, how serious on a global scale.
In May, Iranian Prime Minister Qavam reached an agreement with the Soviets that would give them majority ownership in a northern Iranian oil company; around the same time, he also appointed three members of the Tudeh party and three pro-Tudeh politicians to his cabinet. To the U.S. state department, it appeared that the Soviet Union had already entrenched itself in Iran and that it was only a matter of time before Iran would join Romania and Bulgaria, both of which had just fallen to communist governments, in the ranks of global communism. One report stated: “Russia has already achieved such dominance over Iran that Iran seems to have lost its power to speak as a free agent.” Despite the actions on the part of Qavam and the apparent despair of the State Department, the United States did not directly intervene in Iranian politics to guard against the possibility of communist domination. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that Iran was indeed in the U.S. national interest, and the military and state department both agreed that Iran needed to be assisted by the United States. Nearly everyone at this time was, however, uncertain of the true intentions of the Iranian prime minister; not knowing if he was cunningly playing around the Soviets or if he was paving the way for communist take over. Despite this uncertainty, and even though it had declared Iran to be in the national interest, the United States did little more than offer economic aid to Iran. In essence, the United States was continuing to support its Wilsonian Identity, believing that the promotion of democracy was the key to prevent a collapse of Iranian institutions. However, the Anti-Communist identity was also manifesting itself more prominently, as the United States saw democracy promotion as a way of thwarting the communist agenda.
Eventually, Qavam moved to oust the Tudeh supporters from his government, used the military to end the insurrection in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan and denied the Soviets the oil concession that they sought. Following this, the Tudeh party essentially collapsed and the United States deemed it necessary to maintain only a limited alliance with the Iranians, as Iran was considered a low priority for U.S. policymakers. Secretary of State Acheson, continued to view Iran “as potentially another China ripe for a Communist triumph.” While continuing to promote democracy, the United States feared that the shah may potentially move towards a right-wing dictatorship as he sought to centralize power in his own hands and that this shift towards authoritarianism would strengthen Communist sympathies. The specter of Soviet takeover still haunted the United States, and in the shah they felt they saw someone who could potentially, although inadvertently, aid this takeover because of his own weakness, indecisiveness and affixation on power. Even so, the priority for the United States the promotion of democracy; as they allowed the shah to remain in power and took no military action to protect against communist subversion.
The attempted assassination of the shah on February 4, 1949 caused the United States to once again reevaluate its policy, as the Tudeh party was outlawed and martial law was declared. In allowing martial law and outlawing of a legitimate political party, the United States showed that democracy promotion was no longer of such central focus in their foreign policy role. Iran was, in addition to undergoing political upheaval, also experiencing economic problems and turned to its oil revenues for development funds—that meant negotiating with Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the British. Iran had been engaged in negotiations with the AIOC since 1948, but had come away with only minor concessions. It is in its attitude towards British actions in Iran, that the United States exhibited its most prominent shift away from the Wilsonian Identity. While sympathizing with Iranians and feeling that economic aid and democracy promotion were central to keeping Iran from falling under the Iron Curtain, the United States did not take exert any extreme pressure on the British to contribute to Iran’s economic situation.
Promotion of democracy and capitalism should have entailed a demand from the United States that the British also abide by those principles, but no such demand was ever fully enforced by the U.S. government—the actions taken against the British were symbolic at best. The Soviets had eliminated themselves from alliance with the United States and only the British remained. In the British, the United States had an ally that could prove valuable in a confrontation with the Soviet Union, as Stephen Kinzer notes, “solidarity between the United States and Britain was the bedrock of [NATO],” which was formed in 1949. More portentously, Kinzer continues, “differences over how to deal with countries like Iran could not be allowed to weaken [the alliance].” Thus alliances and defense against communism were becoming more important to the United States than was solving problems through democratic means. As a result of the U.S-British alliance, Iran would soon enter the most cataclysmic period in its interaction with the great powers up to this point—an interaction that would see the final shift in the saliency of U.S. foreign policy role identity.
The Remaking of the Alliance: 1950-53
By 1950, the United States was moving increasingly towards the solidification of the Anti-Communist role identity as its primary identity—prompted by the fall of Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Yugoslavia, and China in the preceding years, along with the Soviet test of a nuclear bomb in 1949. It appeared that Communism was on the verge of sweeping the globe and democracy was doing little to counter its spread. Perhaps no single document better exemplifies the shift that was taking place in the U.S. identity than NSC-68, authored by the National Security Council in January, 1950. This document established the policy of “hard containment,” in contrast to the policy of “soft containment” that had been propagated by George Kennan in 1947.
NSC-68, almost from the outset, lays out a view of the Soviet Union as a pernicious empire bent on world domination:
…the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, anti-thetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods…The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself. They are issues which will not await our deliberations.

The stakes were thus set at the highest possible level: the future of the world. Dorr’s position of 1945 had also been abandoned, as the United State was now seen as needing to act without hesitation rather than waiting to see what the intentions of the Soviet Union. Essentially, NSC-68 also nearly-explicitly stated that the United States had very nearly completed the shift to the Anti-Communist Identity, asserting: “The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion.” Concomitantly, the dichotomy was now established of that as the “free society” versus the “slave state;” free societies being not just democracies but all non-communist states. The Wilsonian Identity with its defining characteristic of democracy promotion had been subsumed to the conflict at hand.
The transition from the Wilsonian to the Anti-Communist identity, however, was not yet complete as the United States still sought to maintain the prime minister post in Iran and prevent the shah from usurping too much power. The U.S. at this time was looking for “charismatic, non-communist reform leaders in the Third World.” In Iran, this led to the appointment of Ali Razmara as prime minister, followed shortly by Mossadegh’s replacement of him in 1950. The events that soon followed these appointments would, however, complete the transition to the Anti-Communist Identity as the most salient foreign policy role identity of the United States.
Tired of British exploitation of Iran’s oil reserves and its essential theft of Iranian revenues, in April 1951, the Majilis unanimously voted to nationalize the Iranian oil industry — thus liberating itself from the neo-imperialism of the British. The Tudeh party, along virtually every sector of Iranian society, supported oil nationalization; Mossadegh, remaining committed to a free, open and democratic society allowed the Tudeh to continue to function but he remained an ardent opponent of communism. By June, British warships were off the coast of Iran, as the British, in an act of “utter folly” were trying to overthrow Mossadegh. This move presaged the events that were to soon follow. By September, the British had orchestrated an international boycott of Iranian oil; nearly simultaneously, “British commanders drew up plans for 70,000 troops to seize [the oil refinery on the Iranian island of] Abadan and the [Iranian] oil fields.” President Truman stressed to the British that the United States would never back a British invasion of Iran, that did not mean, however, that the United States would take any action against the British to preserve Iran’s economy. Thus, the United States was reaffirming that its alliance with the British was, as a function of the Anti-Communist Identity, of vital importance. The British, perhaps sensing this, began to plot a coup d’etat to overthrow Mossadegh in November 1952. The planning for the coup was kept under wraps until the Eisenhower administration took office, although CIA officers continued to participate. “It was unlike any plan that either country, or any country, had [ever] made before.”
The Iranian oil crisis and conflict with the British was further exacerbated between November 1952 and the inauguration of President Eisenhower on January 1953, causing further alarm in the United States. In February 1953, the new Secretary of State, Allen Dulles, admitted that he knew Mossadegh was not a Communist, but maintained that “if he were to be assassinated or removed from power, a political vacuum might occur in Iran and the communists might easily take over.” Dulles further asserted that while the United States would indeed support a dictator to maintain the stability of Iran. When the shah, in 1950, had asserted that the Communists could, at any time, try to take over Iran, the United States had responded by aiding the Iranians and supporting the government. In March 1953, Mossadegh raised the exact same possibility, but this time it was met with quite a different response: it was viewed as supporting Dulles’ predictions and gave further strength to the case for conducting a coup d’etat. The plans to overthrow Mossadegh continued to gain momentum within the State Department and CIA, and eventually gained approval from President Eisenhower on July 11. The cogs were fully in motion and Kermit Roosevelt struck out for Iran. The United States was thus proving just how far democracy had fallen in its priority list as it sought to bring down, rather than support, an ardent democrat in Mohammed Mossadegh—a man who, according to one U.S. estimate had the support of approximately 95 to 98 percent of Iranians —in favor of stopping communism.
As mentioned in the opening of this paper, the coup was anything but the traditional coup. Instead of relying primarily on military forces, the coup relied primarily upon bribery. Furthermore, the coup was deliberately orchestrated to appear as if a legal dismissal of the prime minister had taken place. On August 12, Roosevelt’s assembled crowds took to the streets of Tehran, protesting Prime Minister Mossadegh and declaring their support for the Shah. The Shah also issued two firmans (royal decrees), one dismissing Mossadegh and the other appointing Zahedi in his stead. However, under the Iranian Constitution, it was solely the prerogative of the Majilis, not the Shah, to dismiss the prime minister. The attempt to oust Mossadegh, however, met with vehement opposition from his supporters and was eventually thwarted. Kermit Roosevelt decided to try one last time, which led to the successful overthrow of Mossadegh on August 19.
The overthrow of Mossadegh was the point at which the Anti-Communist Identity of the United States prevailed over its Wilsonian Identity. This did not, however, mean that the Wilsonian Identity was completely eliminated. Alexander Wendt asserts that when identities come into conflict it is impossible to predict how that conflict will be resolved; that is precisely what happened in the case of U.S. foreign policy role identity in 1953. By using the CIA to carry out the operation, the United States hoped to maintain the façade that it was indeed a democracy that supported democracies, but also respected the territorial integrity of other states and would not interfere with their internal politics. Mossadegh, until the final moments, had remained an ardent democrat, but that did not stop the United States from ousting him. Because it was no longer about propping up democracies but about guarding against the Communist threat. Mossadegh’s overtures to the Soviet Union were nothing compared to what Prime Minister Qavam had carried out in 1946—Mossadegh deliberately excluded Communists from his government. Moreover, the specter of Communist takeover that Mossadegh raised and Secretary Dulles played up, had similarly been raised by the Shah just 4 years before and had not resulted in any attempt at overthrow. Thus, what changed in Iran was minimal compared to the changes in the perception, and consequently the identity of the United States. Also, the success of Operation Ajax ushered in a new era in U.S. foreign policy, one that would entail not so covert coups in other “threatened” places in the world, notably Guatemala less than a year later. This fact demonstrates better than any other, that the salient identity of the United States had indeed become that of the Anti-Communist, because a single incident could be downplayed as an anomaly but the adoption of coup as policy reinforces the argument of a shift in identity.
Conclusion: Process-based Identity
The United States never completely abandoned the Wilsonian Identity as it progressed from ally of the Soviet Union to bitter rival, over the course of the decade 1943 to 1953. Instead, what occurred was a sort of schizophrenic, disjointed internal battle over which identity, the Wilsonian or Anti-Communist, would be most salient and most tenable. Operation Ajax itself is an excellent example of this identity conflict. By using covert operations, instead of outright military force, the United States sought to mitigate the possibility of being charged with undemocratic or, even worse, anti-democratic actions. In addition, the United States did not orchestrate a complete overhaul of the Iranian political system by eliminating the Majilis and investing sole authority in the Shah. Instead, it arranged for the Shah to appoint a puppet prime minister and maintain the Majilis, while bestowing ultimate authority in the monarch.
As demonstrated above, the shift in the foreign policy role identity was the result of a prolonged process of constant interaction, perception (and misperception), evaluation and reevaluation. In short, it did not occur overnight, but it did occur rather rapidly. Ten years, in international politics, is not a very long period for such a monumental shift to occur: from ally of the Soviet Union to its most bitter rival. Furthermore, this process-based theory of identity shows that the Cold War was never absolutely inevitable. In effect, it was only through the adamant belief on the part of both the Soviet Union and United States that conflict between the two superpowers was inevitable that it became inevitable. The United States had, at one point, been willing to concede to the Soviet Union a cushion zone to protect against outside invasion such as it had suffered twice before from Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany.
Tim Weiner asserts that, “Stalin never had a master plan for world domination, nor the means to pursue it…Nikita Krushchev recalled that Stalin ‘trembled’ and ‘quivered’ at the prospect of a global combat with America.” The Soviet Union’s “only postwar foreign policy had been to turn Eastern Europe into an enormous human shield.” Despite this intent of the Soviet Union, such was not the perception of the United States. This was, in essence, a matter of a security dilemma expanded to a global scale. Alexander Wendt asserts that “people act toward…other actors on the basis of the meaning that [the other actors] have for them.” This is precisely what happened in U.S.-Soviet interaction, the United States perceived the Soviet Union immediately following World War II as an ally and even a potential friend but Soviet actions to reinforce their own national security caused the United States to reassess. Iran happened to be one of the central fronts at which the Soviet Union sought to sheer up its national security, thus it became a battleground for the two superpowers.
As asserted above, role identities are the result of a state interacting with significant others: in the case of the Cold War, the only significant other for the United States and Soviet Union was each other because they were the only two superpowers in the international system. That is to say role identities are “mutually constitutive.” In this regard, “Westphalian states…do not appreciate the ways in which they depend on each other for their identity.” It is crucial to note that the Soviet Union and United States were rivals, not enemies. “Rivals know that they are members of a group in which individuals do not kill each other, but…center instead on…protecting and advancing their own interests….”
The same was certainly true of the United States during the time period 1943 to 1953; had it eliminated the Soviet Union, it would have been left searching for a new foreign policy role identity and a new Other with which to interact. What mattered, ultimately, was the perception of the intent of the Other on the part of both the United States and Soviet Union, or: “the meanings in terms of which action is organized arise out of interaction.” Thus the United States organized its foreign policy for the next 50 years around the concept of the idea of the Soviet Union as an “evil empire,” consequently it constructed for itself the Anti-Communist Identity with coexisting interests that perpetuated that identity and that role for the Soviet Union.
Iran was the scene of the first significant interaction between the two global superpowers immediately following World War II, as such it occupied a unique position in the international order (a fact reflected by the seemingly inordinate amounts of intention that this small state was given during a time of great power rivalry. First interaction is of momentous importance in the formation of identities:
The first social act creates expectations on both sides about each other’s future behavior: potentially mistaken and certainly tentative, but expectations nonetheless.

Thus, when the Soviet Union began to agitate for oil concession, support Tudeh and exhort
Azerbaijan and Kurdistan to secede, they created the expectation on the part of the United States
that more of the same could be expected in the future. But owing to the partnership between the
two during the war, such expectations were not given excessive wait until they were seemingly
continually reinforced. An actor cannot know what to do until it knows who it is: in Iran, the United States was able to formulate both who it was what it would do.